I. Introduction
It i~ apparen tly a commonplace nowaday~ that there i:. no ~ignificant difference between natural Famil) Planning (NFP) and contraception through artificial means such as the pill. condoms. intrauterine device:-. etc.; they are all methods for regulating conception. So widct>pread i:, thi:, assumption that. despite consistent magisterial teaching to the contrary. it prevails even among Roman Catholics. and no t just among the faithful. where presumably the lack of a sophistica ted moral sensibility precludes the perception of subtle distinctions. but even among :,pccialists in moral thinking whose training would presumably equip them to app reciate any ethically relevant differences between the two rractices. In deed, the moral equivalence of N FP and artificial contraception i~ -.o plain to many Catholic mora lists that they do not even bother to argue for it: rather. it may simp ly be asserted. In the light of this prevalent opinion. the official teaching of the Church :,eem~ rather unen lightened.
1'\umerou:, citati ons from Catholic moralists could be adduced to document thi::. st<tte of <tffai rs. For the purro~es of this exros ition. howe' er. it must suffice to conside r a:, representative the inOuentia l work Human Sexuali1y: .\'ell' Direcriom in American Catholic Though! by Anthony Kosnik et al. The representati\'e and derivative character of the work on this issue is evidenced by its citation and endorsement of the views of famous moralists like Charles Curran and Bernard Haring (among others). The Kosnik book considers contraception within the context of family planning and asserts: "Among the methods employed for contraceptive purposes are: (J) complete abstinence, (2) rhythm, (3) the birth control pill, (4) ovu lation, (5) the progesterone pi\1,(6) intrauterine devices, (7) diaphragms. (8) condoms, (9) basal temperature, (I 0) spermicides, ( 11 ) withdrawal, ( 12) the DES morning-after pill, ( 13) sterilization."' They are all methods of contraception. which itself is equa ted with family planning. Now the work recognizes that some moral distinctions need to be made between the various methods. based primarily on their impact upon the well-being of the persons involved. but such distinctions serve to dissolve rather than maintain the alleged moral difference between NFP and artificial birth control. Periodic continence is simply one form of family planning or contraception whose "natural" quality does not invest it with a moral superiority over "artificial" methods; to assert otherw ise is to betray an excessively biological understanding of the natural law. Thus, iffamily planning can be licit (all would agree that th is is so), then so too are the various contraceptive measures which can pass muster according to newer personal norms (as opposed to the old-fashioned physiological norms of the natural law).
In the face of this widespread moral consensus. the words of Pope John Paul II in Familiaris Consortia appear strange indeed: "lt [the difference between comraception and th e use of the rhythm of the cycle] is a difference which is much wider and deeper than is usually thought, one which involves in the final analysis two irreconcilable concepts of the human person and oflwman sexuality."! Moreover. he goes on to assert that those who contracept commit an evil act which manipulates and degrades human sexuality, while those who legitimately regulate births through N FP, achieve human love at its deepest level. The strong c la im made here. which is fully substantiated in other writings, directly contradicts the popular tendency to connate NFP and artificial birth con trol. And like those who oppose the Church's position. the P ope also appeals to a personalistic norm. ls the papal position a hyperbolic attempt to buttress an outmoded teaching? Or is it rather the longawaited and much needed articulation of the profoundest meaning of the Church's tradition?
The opinio n of John Paull! cannot be reconciled with the opinion of the many. One must be true while the other must be false. Either Kosnik et a/ or J ohn Paul II is correct. Therefore it will be the purpose of this paper to advance a resolution of the dispute on the basis of a careful philosophical analysis oft he issue. The two positions shall be considered analytically without appeal being made to the unique character of papal teaching authority.J The first question to be considered is whether there is a significant difference between art ificial birth control and NFP when February, 1987 they are considered as human actions. In other words, does the introduction of a contraceptive device change t he character of coition so as to make it a different kind of act from intercourse which does not involve such an intervent ion? Secondly, if this is found to be t he case, then what is the moral s ignificance of the difference? F inally. if there is a moral discrepancy between the two forms of birth regulation, then what is impl ied about the corresponding perspectives on the human person and human sexuality?
II. Th e Difference Between Contraceptive Intercourse and Non-contraceptive Int e r course~
The question at issue here is the difference bet ween sexual intercourse which involves the use of contraception and intercourse w hich does not involve co ntraception. The focus wi ll be on the particu lar performa nee of the conjuga l act. This insistence is necessary at the outset because the discussion i!. often m udd led by the failure to distinguis h between ind ividual acts of contraceptive intercourse and the pattern o r attitude of the spouses as a who le. This confusion is fostered by those w ho would like to redefine contraceptio n as a mentality or disposition marking the marriage as a w hole, ra ther than something which refers p ri marily and properly to individual acts of intercourse. 5 Both aspects of the situation. the individua l ac t and the overall attitude. are relevant to the mora l assessment of the action. Yet these two aspects must be kept separate in order to u nderstand and then eva luate t he deed. It is necessa ry to consider t he action first qua ind ivid ua l action and then qua part of an established pattern of action.
What distinguishes an act of co n traceptive intercourse from an ac t of n on-contraceptive intercou rse is t hat the former involves the choice t o do something before. dur ing, o r after the act wh ich dest roys t he possibility of conception precisely because .it is bel ieved that such a choice w ill indeed negate the possibility of conception.c' In ot her words. contraception invo lves the execution of a choice to exclude concepti6n from an act w hich by nature involves t hat possibility. Normal sexual intercourse is an intrinsically genera tive k ind of act; onecon t race pts because conception is conside red t o be an unacceptable possibili ty here and now. The choice to exclude conception or to contracept may manifest itse lf in a physica l transforma tion of the act of coition in to one which is intrinsica ll y a nt igenerat ive because of the inOuence of c h emical or mechan ical agents. It is more usual. however. fo r cont raception to be accompl ished by some th ing which involves no p hysica l distortion of the act (e.g. the pil l). 7 T his means that qua phys ica l act. cont racep tion may be an intrinsically generat ive kind of act. Yet qua intentional act . or qua act of an intelligent and deliberative human agent. all acts of contraceptive intercourse are antigenerative kinds of acts.
T he key to the e nt ire d iscuss ion. as Anscornbe clearly demo nstrates. is a pro pe r understand ing of intention:
The reason why people a re confused abo ut intention, and why they sometimes th ink there is no difference between conlraceplh e intercou rse:: and the use of infertile times to avoid conception, is this: They don't notice the difference between "in tention" when it means the inte ntio nalness oft he thing you're doing-th a t yo u're doing !his on purpose -and when it means a .fimher or accompanying intent ion ll'ilh which you do the thing . . . Contraceptive intercourse and intercourse using infertile times may be ali ke in res pect of fu rther intention. and these further inte ntio ns ma y be good. justi fied. excellent . . . But contraceptive intercourse is fau lted, not on accou nt of this fu rther intentio n. but because of the kind of intentional actio n you are do ing. The action is nol left by you as the kind of act by which life is tra nsmitted , but is purposely rendered infe rtile. and so changed to anothe r sort of ac t altogether.s
Distinction Between Intentions
With this distinction between the intention with which somethjng is done and the further or accompanying intention (that for the sake of which), it is easy to see what the precise difference is between co ntraceptive intercourse and non-contraceptive intercourse. Both may have the sa me further intention. But there is clear difference bet ween their res pective present intentions. the intentions inherent in the action that is now being performed apart from any accompanying intentions which may or may no t be present. The act of contraception emhodies the intention o f avoiding conception and so makes the coital act a different kind of act (anti-generative) from that which would res ult if that i ntenti o n were not operative. Moreove r. the intention embodied in the action is a cause or part-cause of the infertility of the act: the further circumstances which d ete rmine the fertility of the act (since not eve ry intrinsical ly generative kind of act is, in fact. fertile) include the intention as a cause. 9 Non-contraceptive intercourse revea ls a different s tructure. lt is an intrinsically generative kind of act both physically and intentionaiJy . The re may be a further intention to avoid conception (as co uld be the case in N FP) . but the act itself does not embody the presenJ intention to avoid co nception as is the case when there is interference by artificial birth control. The further intenti o n to avoid conception does not cause infertility since the act is found to be infertile on its own. The intention to avoid conception is manifested in the d etermina tion to avoid intercourse during the woman's fertile period. but this choice does nothing to the sex ual intercourse that is chosen during infertile periods to r e nd er it anti-generative. M o reover. it s ho uld be noted that the choice not to contracept, even when no conception is desired, revea ls a fundamentall y differe nt attitude toward the procreative aspect of the conjugal act (which will be important in the moral evaluation of the act).
Thus it is the case that contraception purposely transforms intercourse into a d ifferent kind of act altogether:
In contraceptive intercourse the 111tentional ac tio n is delibera tely altered fro m being a gene rative kind of ac ti on to being a n ac t of a ttai ni ng sexual climax. This accou nt of\\ ha t the inie nt ional act here is ought . I think. LObe February. 1987 accepted. whether we approve of such an act or not. For it is not a question of the further purpose or intention with \\ hich the act is done-to foster the well-being of the parents. ~ustain their love. etc.. but of\\ hat the intentional act itself is: namely. the couple"s use of one another"s bodies. no longer to perform a generative type of act. but for one or both to achieve orgasm. 1 o Let it be noted that the essential difference between contraceptive intercourse and non -contraceptive intercourse is located in the intentional structure of the act qua human act; the issue is in no way determined by mere biological or physical factors. H"aving thus isolated the relevant difference as lying in the embodied intention o f contraceptive intercourse to negate the procreative aspect oft he ac t and so transfor m its character. it remains now to evaluate the moral significance of that difference.
III. The Morality of Negating the Procreative As pect of the Conjugal Act
ln order to ma intain clarity of focus, it must be understood t hat what precisely is at issue here is the moral difference between contraceptive intercourse and non-contraceptive intercourse as they have been defined in the preceding analysis. What is not at issue is the legitimacy of intelligent family planning. which the Chu rch recognizes and condones. ' ' For the purposes of t he present ana lysis, the further or surrounding intentions wil l be presumed upright in bot h cases: that is, it is assumed that the issue is truly family planning and not the complete avoidance of conception which would be condem n able regardless of hmv it was achieved because it violates t he intrinsic meaning of the marital union. 11 Nor is extra-marital intercourse at issue here, although the moral resolution of contraception in general will affect the evaluation of every act of intercourse. By elim inating these other morally relevant features of the action (the finis and the circumstances) from the present consideration. it is possib le to focus squarely on the crucial question of the morality of intending here and now to negate the procr~ative aspect of the conjugal act. For if contraception is condemnable, it is so precise ly because it embodies an intention to avoid generat ion which makes the sexua l act a different kind of act regard less of any further intentions.
The moral evaluation can be distinguished into two separate but related questi ons. The first concerns the morality of the ant i-procreati,·e intention embodied in the contracepti,·c act. while the second concerns the morality of the resulting new kind of act io n. With regard to the first concern. it is often argued tha t contraception is wrong because it constitutes an illicit interference into the course of nature. Yet this argument is inadequate insofar as it fails to make clear what makes this form of interference condemnable when o t her forms of interference (e.g .. medical procedures) are licit and even laudable. Anscom be's treatment of the issue is incomp lete: she correctly ident ifies the question without dissecting it with her usual clarity. 11 She observes that by directly excluding procreation, contraception deprives sexual intercourse of that which is universally recognized (by a "mystical perception'') to be what makes it profoundly significant a nd indeed unique among a ll human activities (witness the association of sexuality with shame). The result of this deprivation is a trivialization and degradation of intercourse into something done casually for the sake of sensual gratification . Yet while Anscom be's intuition on this count is surely true, it is still necessary to say more concerning the impropriety of this kind of tampering with natural processes.
Inseparable Dimensions
This brings the discussion directly to the central issue of the inseparability of the unitive and procreative dimensions of sexual intercourse. 14 Why is this natural connection inviolable? The question cannot be satisfactorily settled as lo n g as the connection is seen as a mere biological datum of an impersonal order of nature. According to this perspective. the connection stands manipulatable to human technology like other processes of nature which rna n masters in order to serve his own ends (sometimes for weal and some times for woe). No. the connection must be seen to reflect the will of the personal Creator wherein He safeguards and promotes the highest values of created existence.'s Observation of the natural law then becomes the means to the authentic realization of the human person and n ot slavish devotion to biology. It is a matter of justice to the Creawr not as a nominalist promulgaLOr o(jla1 . but rather as Wisdom itself ordering all things to their proper ends. The assertion being made here is that, contrary to the claims of its proponents. contracept ion does not promote the true values of the human person, but instead degrades and contemns them. How this is so will be made clear during the analysis of the second question concerning the new act which results from a contraceptive intent.
Yet before considering this second question, it must pe noted that there exists another perspective from which to evaluate t he choice to contracept: as a direct a ttack upon o ne of the basic goods of human nature. This line of reasoning has been developed by Ger main Grisez and o thers as part of a natural law argument against contraception.'" The starting point for the argument is the recognition that among the basic goods constitut ive of human nourishing is the good of procreation (separate from the good of life itself) which encompasses the total bringing into being and nurturing of a new human person. lf this is the case, (and both reason and revelation testify that procreation is indeed a basic human good). then what attitude ought we have with regard to it? Now clearly. those who support contraception must take the position that it is permissible under some conditions to act directly against a basic human good because contraception has already been shown to entail an embodied intention to negate procreation. Therefore. those who defend contraception must a rgue accord in g to proportiona l is t principles whereby one may legitimately act against a basic good in order to bring abou t some other good(s); in th is case the argument wou ld be that one may assai l the good of procreation for the sake of the unitive good. 17 Any methodology which allows for the d irect commission of evi 1 acts. ho\\ever. is se riously defective phi losophica lly and thcologica lt y. 1~ The proper attitude toward basic human goods is that articulated by Grise?:
The good man need not rur~ue e\cr~ flth~iblc good in fact. he cannot do >O. But he must <l\ oid direct ly \"iolaring any or the fund;~ mental goods. I hu' \Omc kind~ of acb arr intrin~icall~ immoral. ror ~ome l..ind' ot act' n ccc,~<lfll~ include in thcm,elvcs a turning again't \Omc basic good. an av~.:r,itln '' hich abo ine~itably implies an rl\crs1on from Goodne's lr~clt . Thi' 'tandard i' a dynamic and cxi,tential one. What i' re<..Juired for the goodne" of a human act ., not that 11 ha\e the be't po''1ble con,equences. but that 11 proceed I rom a tru ly good \li ll. a heart bent upon ull the human good' H\ the image" o l Goodnc~' Itself. Such a moral \tandard alone befit> the d1gnity and freedom of ma n . l~ T herefore contraceptive intercourse is wrong because the direct violation of a basic human good is incompatible "vith the achie,ement of moral excellence.
Escape from Justice lt is important to understand why 1 FP intercourse c:-capcs the abo\e judgment. The earlier intentional ana lysis makes this a n easy ta~k. Wh ile the further intentions of those who con tracept and those \.\'ho do not may be the same, their present intention are quite different. The pn.:-.ent intentions of those engaging in N FP do not embody t he decision to act direct ly against the possibility of conception. The choice to forego intercourse when it is believed to be potentially procreati'c in nowise represents a repudiation of the good of procreation. One doe~ not act against a good simply b) not intending it here and nO\\ . Indeed. abstinence represents a respectful va luing of the good since it is chosen precise!~ because procrea tion cannot be legit imately negated. To be spre. those who engage in 1 FP for legitimate reason~ arc not pursuing the good of procreation when they choose to have intercourse on ly during infertile periods. As Grisez notes above. however. it is not necessary to pursue all the human goods at once: but it is required that one not act direct ly against any of the basic goods in the course of rursuing another good. Thus while NFP inte rcourse may be non-procreative by ,·irtuc of ih further intention:-. it is never directly anti-procreati\e like contracepti\·e intercourse. Therein ties perhaps the most important moral difference.
It rema ins now to cons ider the mora lity of the new :-cx ual act brought into being by the intention to contracept. As was e:-tablishcd earlier. contraception transforms intercourse from a generat ive kind of action (and so a true marital act) into an act of attaining sexual c limax through the use of one another's bodies (an ersat1 marital act) .~u Does this negation of the procreative aspect truly serve the uni tive persona l dimension of scxua lity as the defender~ of contraception cia i m'! Or arc thc two aspects of coition so inextricably intertwined that to negate the pr ocreative dimension is to vitiate the unitive dimension? The truth of the latter position has been convincingly articulated by John Paul II, especially in a work which he authored prior to assuming the papacy entitled Love and Responsihility.ll
The fundamental moral principle of Lo1·e and Responsihiliry is the personalistic norm:
Thb norm. in its negati' e aspect. states that the person is the kind of good which docs not admit of use and cannot be treated as an object of use and as such the means to an end. In its positive form the personalist ic norm confirms this: the person is a good toward which the only proper and adequate altitude is love. I he po~itive coment of t he persona listic norm is precisely what the commandment to love tcache~.!2
Within the context of marriage as the lasting union of persons involving the possibility of procreation . sexual relations are evaluated according to this norm as the safeguard against utilitarianism (treating the person as an object). The inseparability of the unitive and procreative aspects of the marital act is pred icted upon this principle. Contraception violates the principle.
The proper way for a person to deal with his or her sexuality is to recognize that the inner dynamism of the sexual act toward procreation is the indispensable cond ition for the reali7ation of love between persons. The latter must respect the inner logic of the former in order to be authentic. This means that the mutual acceptance of procreation and the possibility of parenthood are necessary for the sexual union to be truly personal union: "Neither in the man nor in the woman can affirmation of the value of the person be divorced from awareness and willing acceptance that he may become a father and that she may become a mother."~3 True personal love demands both the conscious acceptance of the other as a potential parent and the conscious donation of the self as a potential parent.
Exclusion of Possibl e Parenthood
If the possibi lity of parenthood is deliberately excluded from marita l relations by contraception. then the character of the relationship changes radically. The transformation is from a relationship of authentic personal love toward a utilitarian relationship of mutual enjoyment which is incompatible with the personalistic norm. Instead of regarding the spouse as a potential co-creator in love of another person. the other becomes a partner in an erotic experience. In this case. the erotic urge~ degrade the relationship of love by negating the true value of persons in favor of mutual sensual satisfaction divorced from total reciprocal elf-donation. By violating the nat ural dynamism toward procreation. which is a constitutive feature of the sexual act. one explo its the other by making him or her into something less than a person (i.e .. an obj ect for enjoyment). And by succumbing lO sexua l urges in this way. rather t han mastering February. 1987 them in the ~ervice of au thent ic personal love. the agent acts in ales::. than personal way himself.24
IV. The Ultimate Distinction Between Contraception and NFP
Having established the philosophical difference bet\.veen contraceptive intercourse and non-eontracepti\'e intercour~e and having shown that the former is intrinsically immoral becau~c it constitutes a direct assault upon the procreative good which is crea ti\'ely inscribed with the unitive good at the heart of human !>exualit y in orde r to promote the good of the person. the essay can now co nclude with a conside rati on of the implications of these findings for an understanding of the human person and human sexua lity. It shou ld be poss ible now to discern the full import of the previously quoted wo rd s of John Paul II in Familiaris Comortio: " It is a difference [between contraception and recourse to the rhythm of the cycle] which is much wider and deeper than is usua lly thought. one which in\'oh·es in the final ana lysis two irreconcilable concepts of the human person and human ::.exua lity."
With regard to the practice of contraception. the Pope notes: "When coup les. by mean~ of recourse to contraception. separate these two meanings that God the Creator has inscribed in the being of man and woma n a nd in the dynamism of their sexua l co mmunio n. they act as 'arbiters' of the d ivine plan and they ' ma nipula te' and degrade human sexua lit y and with it themselves and their married partner by altering its val ue of •total' self-giving." 2 5 The severance of the procreative and the uniti\'e dimensions of the conjugal act manifests more than a dubious intervention into nature or even an impious disrespect for the work of the Creator. Ra ther. it represents a contemning of the infinite \'alue of the human person. through exploitation for pleasure. in the very context (marriage) wherein re\'erence and lo,·e for that value are meant to find their ultimate expression. Sexual acts which deliberately negate the possibility of parenthood cannot lay claim to the description of mutual self-donati on: "Thus the innate language that expresses the tbtal reciprocal self-givi ng of husband and wife is overlaid . through co ntraceptio n. by an object ively contradictory language. namely. that of not gi' ing oneself totally to the other. "l 1 • This l ead~ to the question of the true meaning of the "language of the body". a topic upon which J ohn Paul II ha~ exp ressed profound considerations. Richa rd Hogan summari7C!) some central featu res of the Pope's thought as follows: 56 If the bod~ (either male or fema le) i~ the exprt:\\ion of a human per~on. then the gilt of a man and a'' oman t o one a not her~~ tndccd 1 he gtft oft\\ o pcr~ons to one anot her A~ the bod~ i~ the \acrarnent o l a pcr~on. \O the ph~'ical gift of a man and a woman j, the OU I\\ard stgn. the sacrament. ol a etllll/11111111111 o/f>t'f\(1/!S. /\nd thi., ~ac:ramcnt i;. a ;.hadO\\ or r.:nection ol the communion of the th ree person;. of the hle~~ed Tri nit~. The body. then. t\ the means and the ,ign llfthe gtfl of t he ma n -per~on to the fema le-person. fhe H o ly l· at hercalb thi ,capari t~ oft he body to c. \prc'' lmc the 111/flliaiiiH'anillg o(the hllllr r Men and women are therefore called to express the language of their bodies in a ll the truth that is proper to it as the authentic revelation and sacrament of the human person. According to the objective truth of this language, the conj ugal act signifies both love and potential fecundity such that to deprive it of the latter is also to deprive it of the former. Therefore the Pope concludes:
It can be said that in the case of an artificial separation of these two aspects. there is carried out in the conjugal act a real bodily union. but it does not correspond to the interior truth and to the dignity of personal communion: commumon of persons. This communion demands in fact that the ·tanguage of the body' be expressed reciprocally in the integral truth of its meaning. If this truth be lacking. one cannot speak either oft he truth of self-mastery, or of the reciprocal gift and of the reciprocal acceptance of self on the part of the other person. Such a' iolation of the interior order of conjugal union. which is rooted in the ,·cry order of the person. constitutes the essential cYil of the contraceptive act.~• Those who admit the licitness of contraceptive intercourse obviously cannot accept an anthropology which so intimately connects the spiritual and the corporeal with in the unity oft he person. In order to legitimate the choice to negate the procreative dimension of sexual intercourse. they must regard that dimension as essentially subordinate to and separate from the relational or unitive dimension of sexuality; the latter belongs intrinsically to the personal order, whi le the former may or may not, depending upon whether it is consciously assumed and chosen by the subject. 29 By itself. the procreative dimension belongs to the biological or sub-personal order (where it becomes "reproduction"). Thus the contraceptive position depends upon a dualist anthropology and its concomitant separatist view of sexuality which are objectionable on both philosophical and theological grounds. 30 There is also a deep irony im·olved in this position because the proponents of contracept ion normally accuse the -Church's teaching of refiecting "physicalism": "The truth is that the advocates of contraception arc guilty of physicalism. for they reduce the human body and the human. personal power of giving life to a new person to mere material instruments meant to serve consciously experienced goods, which for them a re the 'higher' goods of human existence."Jt In contrast to the dualist anthropology and separatist understanding of sexuality which undergirds the contraceptive position, the foundations of those who promote N FP are personalist and integralist, along the lines laid down by John Paul 11. To regulate births by reading the language of the body in truth is a ministration or God'!> plan which respects the good oft he other by respecting the natural dynamism of the marital act toward true self-giving. As John Paul notes. NFP provides an entirely different context for the communion of persons which is marriage:
The choice of the natural rhythms in\'oiYes accepting the cycle of the per~on. that i~. the woman, and thereby accepting the dialogue. reciprocal respect. shared responsibility and ~elf-control. To accept t he cycle and to enter into dialogue means 10 recognize both the spiritual and corporal character of conjugal communion anc.lto the pcr~onallo\e with its requirement of fidelity. n In order to practice NFP as this kind of communio personarum. mere empirical knowledge of the cycle of fertility is insufficient. Rather, what is required is virtuous self-mastery or the "capacity to direct the sensual and emotive reactions [so] as to make possible the giving of self to the other 'I' on the grounds of mature self-possession of one's own '1' in its corporeal and emotive subjectivity."3J The sexual urge must be mastered so as to resist any tendencies to degrade the re lationship to where it expresses something other than persona l love. NFP is based on the virtue of continence or marital chastity not simply because of the requirement of periodic abstinence. but rather because it is only by mature self-possession of one's psychosomatic subjectivity that the sexual union truly becomes a personal union. The virtue of marital chastity is not a priggish ''refraining from". but rather a positive "capacity for": it does not detract from personal love. bu t rather enhances it. Personal love and chastity are inseparable. John Paul summarizes this beautifully as follows:
If conjugal chastity (and chastity in general) ts manifested at lirst as the capacity to resist the concupi~cencc of 1 he llesh. it later gradually reveals itself as a singular capacity to perceive. love and practice those meanings of the 'language of the body' "hich remain a ltogether unknown to concupiscence itself and which progressively enrich the marital dialogue of the couple. purifying it. deepening it. and at the same ttme simplifying it. Therefore. that asceticism of continence. of which the encyclical speab ( Humanae J 'i!ae, n.2 1 ). does not impoverish 'affective manifestations.' but rather makes them spiritually more intcn~c and therefore enriches them.14 By now it should be plain that contraception and NFP are not two equal "methods" to the same end as suggested by Kosnik et al. It would be better to categorize them as representing two radically different approaches to the human person and human sexuality or as two competing "theologies of the body". Roth style themselves as serving the authentic values of the human person as created in the image and likeness of God. Yet both cannot be true; their opposition is too great. If the preceding analysis is accurate. then the judgment concerning their relative me/its should prove to be relatively easy. The view which recogni?es the critical moral i mporta nee of the intentional structure of hu rna n action and the authentic meaning of personal love is the view which ought to compel assent. That such a view is the official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church is perhaps no accident. Yet in the final ana lysis. the grounds for submitting to it are noth ing other than the grounds of truth itself.
